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Commentary
The Bounty Hunter" Objection to
Antitrust Litigation
Henry Kane*
The purpose of this article is to examine the validity of the "bounty
hunter" objection to plaintiff's treble damage antitrust litigation, to
review the difficulties encountered by the treble damage "bounty
hunter" and to suggest how states and other public bodies may make
more effective use of the antitrust laws."
"Status for the Bounty Hunter. . . and Other Recent Developments
in Private Antitrust Litigation" 2 by Mr. John C. Scott, developed the
"bounty hunter" theme first enunciated by Earl E. Pollack in an ad-
dress before the Section of Antitrust Law of the American Bar Associa-
tion.3 Mr. Scott recalled his boyhood feelings of guilt when he collected
noxious animal bounties, for his favorite author took a dim view of
bounty hunters and "it just didn't seem right to get paid for having so
much fun."' 4 Indeed, "... the bounty hunter of the Old West is seldom
portrayed as an admirable character. . . .,,5 This quixotic approach was
then put to the hard facts of Antitrust Law, and Mr. Scott concluded:
• . . it was not the pronouncements of a Supreme Court
blessing that opened the Golden Age of the antitrust bounty
hunter. That era arrived with the filing of some 1900 treble-
damage suits in the wake of the 1960 convictions and 1961 sen-
tencing of the electrical equipment industry for conspiring to fix
prices. It was what these cases did for bounty hunters that makes
the Supreme Court's helpful attitude so significant to the business
world and to the legal profession .... People with ample means
to finance the long search and the complex shoot-out are now
bounty hunters."6
* Member of the Oregon State Bar; former head of the Antitrust Division, State of
Oregon Department of Justice.
1. The antitrust laws are set forth in detail in E. W. GAss, Private Enforcement of the
Robinson-Patman Act: The Damage Controversy, XV Airrrrmur BuLLETrIN 153, 158-159
(1970).
2. 7 DUQUESNE L.R. 353 (1969).
3. E. S. POLLACK, Standing to Sue, Remoteness of Injury, and the Passing-on Doctrine,
32 ANTITRUST L.J. 5, 38 (1966).
4. Supra note 2 at 353.
5. Id. at 359.
6. Id. at 363-364.
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Before proceeding to analyze the two addresses 7 to determine
whether antitrust plaintiffs as a class or any of them are "bounty
hunters" and whether the decisions on which they rely are in accord
with the antitrust laws, it is helpful to examine treble damage litigation
from the viewpoint of a prospective defendant with reason, well-
founded or otherwise, to fear liability. Mr. Scott is correct in stating
that in recent years the opinions of the Supreme Court "have made
increasingly warm statements about private antitrust litigation." The
statements have been in decisions which reversed lower court decisions
for antitrust defendants. 9
The stakes in a treble damage action can be high for a defendant,
whether he be large or small. The adverse publicity can have an ad-
verse effect on the price of a company's stock or its efforts to obtain
financing. A pending antitrust case challenging the validity of a com-
pany's method of doing business can make the company's stock "spec-
ulative." Unless a case is dismissed on a motion for summary judgment
at the commencement of the litigation, defense costs are heavy. For
example, the General Counsel for a defendant in a subsequently settled
series of treble damage class actions said in open court that his com-
pany had paid about $500,000 per year in legal expenses and costs to
defend itself. Antitrust judgments or settlements can also have a
noticeably adverse effect on earnings, and may require payment over
a period of years if the defendant is to remain solvent. In cases in-
volving multiple defendants the larger defendants may pay a dispro-
portionate amount of the settlement package.
No accurate totals on treble damage awards and settlements can be
made with assurance because most antitrust cases are settled. The
settlements are confidential unless the plaintiff is a public body or the
court approves a class action settlement.' 0 However, a partial list of
recoveries indicates that total antitrust judgments and settlements
since 1960 is approaching the $1 billion mark. Recoveries were about
$600 million in the electrical equipment conspiracy cases." The West-
ern Pipe Cases, excluding recently filed cases, 12 were settled for about
7. Supra notes 2 and 3.
8. Supra note 2, at 363.
9. Infra note 42.
10. Rule 23(e), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
11. J. L. ALIOTO, The Economics of a Treble Damage Case, 32 ANTrrRusT L.J. 87, 88
(1966); H. R. HALPER, The Unsettling Problems of Settlement in Antitrust Damage Cases,
32 ANTrraUST L.J. 98, 115 (1966).
12. In re Concrete Pipe (West), 303 F. Supp. 507; State of Utah v. American Pipe and
Construction Company, 49 F.R.D. 17 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
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$30 million. The copper and brass tubing litigation, notable for use of
a formula to determine the amount of tubing in a structure, was settled
for about $22,175,000.13 A $100 million settlement of 66 class actions
was approved in State of West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer r Co.14 The
single case record is Trans World Airlines v. Hughes,15 in which the
Court awarded attorneys' fees of $7.5 million following award of dam-
ages trebled to $137,611,435.
Antitrust and other plaintiffs are aided in their discovery, which
can be the difference between a plaintiff's or a defendant's verdict, by
recent amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Amended
Rule 34 removes the "good cause" requirement that often proved an
obstacle to obtaining an order for production of defendant's docu-
ments. Rule 33 interrogatories and Rule 34 requests for production of
documents now can be served with the complaint, giving him priority
of discovery where such priority can be vital.
The coordination procedures authorized by 28 U.S.C. §1407 and
administered by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation can be
of material assistance to antitrust plaintiffs by providing for assignment
of all cases to one judge.' This procedure enables a multitude of small
plaintiffs to combine their resources and thereby increase the strength
of their position. The panel's Manual for Complex and Multidistrict
Litigation, as revised May 18, 1970, incorporates the discovery and
other features pioneered in the electrical and other antitrust cases. A
number of the provisions are of material benefit to the plaintiff, e.g.,
section 0.5 provides that in the absence of rare and exceptional circum-
stances ". . . all parties should proceed simultaneously with discovery in
the separate stages. 11' 6a
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is another cause for
concern to potential defendants since exposure to liability is enlarged
if the court designates the complaint as a class action and directs that
notice be sent to members of the class.' 7 The complaint as a class action
13. Philadelphia Electric Comany v. Anaconda American Brass Company, 47 F.R.D.
557, 558 (E.D. Pa. 1969). Thirteen copper and brass producers paid $22,127,500 to more
than 800 plaintiffs. Wall Street Journal, June 21, 1969.
14. 312 F. Supp. 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
15. 314 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). Also see supra, note 1 at 160-161 for other large
recoveries.
16. C. A. PLrERSON, JR. AND J. T. McDERMoTr, Multidistrict Litigation: New Forms of
Judicial Administration, 56 A.B.A.J. 737 (1970).
16a. 49 F.R.D. 217 (1970).
17. Rule 23(c)(2), F.R. Civ. P.
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enables the original plaintiff or a small number of original plaintiffsI8
to call to the attention of others similarly situated the existence of the
case, its allegations and the opportunity to participate. The more class
members who join, the more the plaintiffs can combine their efforts,
knowledge and resources to include every member of the class who does
not exclude himself19 unless, of course, the court strikes the class action
allegations of the complaint after passing of a deadline for members of
the class to intervene. 20 Not every case has been allowed to proceed as a
class action, 21 but those that have been declared class actions have en-
larged the liability of the defendants. 22
Potential antitrust defendants with grounds to believe they may be
exposed to antitrust litigation have reason to note the growth of the
"respectability" 23 of such litigation and the steady rise in the number
of cases filed.24 The annual report of the Director of the Administra-
tive Office of the United States Courts said that in fiscal 1970 the num-
ber of new federal antitrust cases rose by 17 per cent over fiscal 1969, to
877, compared with 740 in fiscal 1969.25 The report indicated that the
government's case load continued at a comparatively even pace-56
cases (52 civil, 4 criminal) were filed in fiscal 1970, one less than the 57
filed in fiscal 1969 (43 civil, 14 criminal).26 And commencing with the
18. "One or more members of a class may sue or be sued . Rule 23(a), F.R. Civ.
P. infra, note 78.
19. Rule 23(c)(2), F.R. Civ. P.
20. Id. L. H. EIGER, Private Consumer Substantive and Procedural Remedies Under
the Antitrust Laws, XV ANTrrusT BULLETIN 316-317 (1970).
21. City of New York v. International Pipe and Ceramics Corporation, 44 F.R.D. 584(S.D.N.Y. 1968); State of Utah v. American Pipe and Construction Co., 49 F.R.D. 17
(D.C. Calif. 1969); United Egg Producers v. Bauer International Corporation, 312 F.
Supp. 319 (S.D.N.Y.); Mangano v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corporation,
50 F.R.D. 13 (E.D. Pa. 1970), and Philadelphia Housing Authority v. American Radiator
& Standard Sanitary Corp., 1970 Trade Cases, 73,410 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 14, 1970).
22. Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 722 (N.D. Cal. 1967), affirmed as mod-
ified, Chicken Delight, Inc. v. Harris, District Judge, 412 F.2d 830 (9th Cir. 1960); State
of Minnesota v. United States Steel Corporation, 44 F.R.D. 559 (Minn. 1968); State of
Illinois v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 484 (N.D. Ill. 1969); Philadelphia
Electric Company v. Anaconda American Brass Company, 43 F.R.D. 452 (E.D. Pa. 1968),
and Research Corp. v. Pfister Associated Growers, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 497 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
One conclusion to be drawn between cases allowed to proceed as class actions and those
refused class action status is that the class must be clearly defined and identifiable, e.g.,
franchisees or public bodies, and large, but not too large for management and disposition
of the litigation.
23. S. E. KEANE, Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 37 ANrrrrTusr L.J. 632, 639 (1968).
24. C.C.H. TRADE REGULATION REPORTS BULLETIN, no. 493, November 23, 1970. The
comparable number of private suits filed, excluding the electrical equipment cases for
prior years was: 1965--443; 1966-444; 1967-536, and 1968-659: E. G. GAss, Private
Enforcement of the Robinson-Patman Act: The Damage Controversy, XV ANTrrRusr
BUL.'IN 153 (1970).
25. C.C.H. TRADE REGULATION REPORTS BuLLIN, no. 493, November 23, 1970.
26. Id.
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electrical equipment conspiracy cases, defendants have the added
headache of a large, well financed plaintiff.2 7 These plaintiffs become
all the more formidable when, as in the Western Pipe and other recent
multi-plaintiff cases, they maintain a common front and act through
lead counsel.28
Large plaintiffs with equally large damages can be, depending on
one's viewpoint, avenging angels or avenging bounty hunters. Web-
ster's defines a bounty hunter as "one that hunts predatory animals for
the reward offered" or "tracks down and captures outlaws for whom a
reward is offered. ' 2 9 Webster's further defines bounty as including a
reward, premium or subsidy, especially when offered by a government,
e.g., to encourage the destruction of noxious animals.8 0 Assuming that
the speakers used the words "bounty hunter"8 ' in accordance with the
dictionary definition, it would appear, by definition, that antitrust
violators are "outlaws" and that an antitrust plaintiff "bounty hunter"
serves a purpose that the government, which authorizes him to seek the
"bounty" of treble damages, considers socially beneficial.
This socially useful purpose of allowing private persons to oppose
monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade did not spring into
the air with the electrical conspiracy cases (the 1960's). Antitrust has
ancient common law roots32 which long-preceded the 1890 Sherman
Act. 3 The Clayton Act provision for treble damages and costs3 4 also
has this ancient common law ancestry. A 1623 Act of Parliament de-
clared monopolies void and authorized treble damages and double
costs.35 We may assume that the treble damage and double costs pro-
visions were designed to encourage private enforcement, for double
costs under the British system of court costs is more punitive than the
27. "It is now by no means strange to have plaintiffs who are larger and wealthier
than the defendants and to find them eminently better equipped with the necessary funds
and manpower to carry on long and expensive legal struggles." E. G. Gass, Private En-
forcement of the Robinson-Patman Act: The Damage Controversy, XV ANTITRUST BULLE-
TIN 153 note 16 (1970).
28. In the Western Pipe Cases, plaintiffs, who numbered some 350, and a relative
handful of defendants, were directed to appoint respective lead counsel as spokesmen
to assist the Court.
29. WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, Unabridged, p. 260.
30. Id.
31. Supra notes 2 and 3.
32. J. L. ALIoTO, The Economics of a Treble Damage Case, 23 ANrrrITusr L.J. 87, foot-
note 1 (1960). The Case of Monopolies, 11 Co. Rep. 84 b, 77 English Reprints 1260
(1601) held void as contrary to common law a grant by the Crown of the monopoly of
making and selling playing cards.
33. 26 Stat. 209.
34. 15 U.S.C. § 15.
35. An Act Concerning Monopolies and Dispensations With Penal Laws and the
Forfeitures Thereof, Jac. ch. 3 (1623).
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single costs deemed adequate by the Congress in the American counter-
part.80 The traditional public antipathy to restraint of trade is reflected
in an Oregon Supreme Court decision. 7 The arguments opposing the
playing card monopoly in the Case of Monopolies38 are a mixture of
Elizabeth I era language and Latin and Greek, yet the English portions
of the case have a modern ring, for the public policy objections to re-
straints of trade are as applicable today as in 1601.
In considering the "bounty hunter" objection to private enforce-
ment of the antitrust laws it is important to note that such enforcement
helps the antitrust laws to perform three pro bono functions:
1. Oppose the "cartelization" of American industry;
2. Discourage attempts to create monopolies, by mergers or other-
wise;
3. Help maintain equality of economic opportunity and freedom of
entry in industry.39
And since so much of antitrust law enforcement is by private parties
and non-federal public bodies, it is enlightening to find that: "The
antitrust laws fulfill these three functions by the very fact of their
existence and enforcement. Their broad deterrent effect is more impor-
tant than the visible effects of particular cases .... -40 Therefore, the
"bounty hunter" objection should be measured against the purpose of
the Sherman Act as enunciated by the Supreme Court.4 1 Assuming
36. 15 U.S.C. § 15.
37. "As stated in 19 R.C.L. 10, § 4, monopolies and combinations in restraint of
trade 'are generally denounced as odious, intolerable, and contrary to public policy and
common right. They are regarded as repugnant to the spirit of our government and
institutions, and are frequently forbidden by constitutional as well as statutory enactment.
Indeed, as the term is generally employed, injury to the public is implied from its use.
Monopoly is said to be destructive of individual rights, and of that free competition
which is the life of business, and it revives and perpetuates one of the great evils which
it was the object of the framers of our form of government to eradicate and prevent. It
is alike destructive to both individual enterprise and individual prosperity, whether con-
ferred on corporations or individuals, and therefore, public policy is, and ought to be, as
well as public sentiment, against it.'" Schwab v. Motion Picture Operators, 165 Or.
602, 622, 109 P.2d 600, 607 (1941). Such declarations serve as a reminder of the purpose
of the antitrust laws and help to balance hair-splitting distinctions that defeat the legis-
lative intent.
38. Supra note 32.
39. S. N. WHrrNEY, II ANTmtusr POLICIES 436-437 (1958).
40. Id. at 437.
41. The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic
liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade. It
rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield
the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality
and the greatest material progress, while at the same time providing an environment
conducive to the preservation of our democratic political and social institutions.
Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4, 78 S. Ct. 514, 2 L. Ed. 2d
45 (1958).
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arguendo that a plaintiff is a "bounty hunter," the policy granting the
bounty of treble damages, costs and attorneys' fees has been approved
in numerous Supreme Court and lower federal court decisions,42 in-
cluding Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc. where the
Court said, ". . . the purpose of giving private parties treble-damage
and injunctive remedies was not merely to provide private relief, but
was to serve as well the high purposes of enforcing the antitrust laws.
E.g., United States v. Borden Co., 347 U.S. 514, 518 (1954) .... -43 The
policy of allowing private enforcement to supplement public enforce-
ment is a reflection of the realization that:
A violation of the antitrust laws is, in effect, a plundering raid
into the market place. As is the case with all predatory excursions,
the strong and powerful enjoy the advantages while the weak and
the small suffer loss, ruin and destruction.44
The "bounty hunter" tag as used by Pollack is limited to "passing-
on" situations in which he asserts that the plaintiffs recover four times
the amount of the overcharge--once from their own customers and
three times the amount of the overcharge from the defendants.45 He
therefore excludes (1) treble damage actions in which no "passing-on"
defense is involved, (2) cases settled for less than four times the amount
of the overcharge,46 or (3) cases in which part or all of the overcharge is
absorbed for competitive or other reasons and is not passed on to the
ultimate customer. He states that "Under the bounty-hunter approach,
injury is of course irrelevant. The principal difficulty with such an
approach is that Congress quite plainly never adopted it."4 The
42. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969); Perma Life
Muffler, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1969); Simpson v. Union Oil
Company of California, 411 F.2d 887, 904 (9th Cir. 1969), rev'd. on other grounds, 396 U.S.
13 (1969); Marine Space Enclosures, Inc. v. Federal Maritime Commission, 420 F.2d 577,
591 (D.C. A. 1969), and United States v. American Bakeries Company, 284 F. Supp. 864,
869 (Mich. 1968). Also see supra note 2, footnote 38 at 363. A classic statement is found
in United States v. Standard Ultramarine and Color Company, 137 F. Supp. 167, 170
(S.D.N.Y. 1955):
The antitrust statutes, as has so often been emphasized, are aimed at assuring that
our competitive enterprise system shall operate freely and competitively. They seek
to rid our economy of monopolistic and unreasonable restraints. Upon their vigorous
and constant enforcement depends the economic, political and social well-being of
our nation. The concept that antitrust violations are "minor" and "technical" infrac-
tions, involve no wrongdoing, and merely constitute "white collar" offenses, has no
place in the administration of justice.
43. Id. at 130-131.
44. P. F. ZIEDMAN, The Small Business Administration and Private Antitrust Litigation,
36 AwrrRusr L.J. 188 (1967).
45. Supra note 3, at 38.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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Supreme Court has rejected such an assertion by holding that a buyer
who is overcharged by a monopolist is injured even though he can pass
the overcharge along to the ultimate consumer. The Court then
enunciated the following principles:
1. .. . when a buyer shows that the price paid by him for materials
purchased for use in his business is illegally high and also
shows the amount of the overcharge, he has made out a prima
facie case of injury and damage within the meaning of § 4.
2. ... if the buyer, responding to the illegal price, maintains his
own price but takes steps to increase his volume or to decrease
other costs, his right to damages is not destroyed.
3. . . . the buyer is equally entitled to damages if he raises the
price for his own product.
4. As long as the seller continues to charge the illegal price, he
takes from the buyer more than the law allows. 48
The Supreme Court cited three cases49 as holding that "In those cases
the possibility that the plaintiffs had recouped the overcharges from
their customers was held irrelevant in assessing damages." 50 It was
made clear that allowance of the "passing-on" defense could mean that
the violator would escape retribution:
In addition, if buyers are subjected to the passing-on defense,
those who buy from them would also have to meet the challenge
that they passed on the higher price to their customers. These
ultimate consumers, in today's case the buyers of single pairs of
shoes, would have only a tiny stake in a lawsuit and little interest
in attempting a class action. In consequence, those who violate the
antitrust laws would retain the fruits of their illegailty because no
one was available who would bring suit against them. Treble-
damage actions, the importance of which the Court has many
times emphasized, would be substantially reduced in effective-
ness. 51
In light of post-Hanover Shoe decisions which recognize the
"passing-on" defense despite its apparent demise 52 it is significant that
the Supreme Court preceded its recitation of factors relied on in the
48. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 489-490 (1968).
It was followed by Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642 (1969), which rejected a
remoteness defense.
49. Id. at 490.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 494.
52. Mangano v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corporation, 50 F.R.D. (E.D.
Pa. 1970) and Philadelphia Housing Authority v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp., 1970 Trade Cases, 75,410.
473
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subsequent decisions by stating, "We are not impressed with the argu-
ment that sound laws of economics require recognizing this defense."5 s
The factors that followed this statement are apparently given as the
Teasons for not allowing the "passing-on" defense. Were the cited fac-
tors to be considered defenses it is assumed that the Supreme Court
would have so identified them. These cited factors are not part of the
dictum:
We recognize that there might be situations-for instance, when
an overcharged buyer has a pre-existing "cost-plus" contract, thus
making it easy to prove that he has not been damaged-where the
considerations requiring that the passing-on defense not be per-
mitted in this case would not be present. We also recognize that
where no differential can be proved between the price unlawfully
charged and some price that the seller was required by law to
charge, establishing damages might require a showing of loss of
profits to the buyer. 54 (Emphasis supplied)
The above-emphasized language indicates that the Supreme Court,
in view of its vigorous opposition to summary judgments in antitrust
litigation,5 5 intends that the plaintiff is to be given the opportunity to
prove his damages. The four principles set forth in Hanover" do not
appear to foreclose the ultimate consumer or anyone else in the chain
of distribution. In a proper case the plaintiff can establish that each
middleman passed on the overcharge, as was done in the Western Pipe
Cases.5 7 Proof of damage may be difficult, but "justice and public policy
require that the wrongdoer shall bear the risk of the uncertainty which
his own wrong has created."58 The Manual .for Complex and Multidis-
trict Litigation contains a number of recommendations relating to
proof of facts in complex cases. 59
If victims in the chain of distribution, including the ultimate
customer, are not allowed to attempt to prove their damages, the anti-
trust violator retains the fruits of his wrongdoing despite the holding
of Hanover that he is not to do so. Mangano,60 which revives the
"passing-on" defense, may be considered of limited authority since the
53. Supra note 48, at 492.
54. Id. at 494.
55. Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 368 U.S. 464 (1962).
56. Supra note 48.
57. With monotonous regularity the approximately 50 contractors deposed said that
they passed on the cost of the pipe to the plaintiffs, who were the "end-users" or ultimate
customers.
58. Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, 327 U.S. 251, 265 (1946).
59. § 2.61 Proof of Facts in Complex Cases, et seq.
60. Supra note 52.
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plaintiffs failed to file full and complete answers to interrogatories
despite the opportunity to do so. The ruling might have been otherwise
had the plaintiffs submitted full and complete answers and made dis-
covery as to damages and submitted proof that ascertainable over-
charges had been passed on to them. The authority of Philadelphia
Housing Authority8l is lessened by the fact that the court deemed itself
bound by the rule of the law of the case established by Mangano z2 and
therefore the public bodies were not allowed to prove their damages as
end-users. Three of the four cases relied on by plaintiffs as allowing
end-users to overcome the "passing-on" defense were distinguished on
their facts in Philadelphia Housing Authority and all four cases were
not followed on the ground that they were decided before Hanover.3
It is difficult to distinguish the facts in State of Washington v. American
Pipe and Construction Co." from those in Philadelphia Housing Au-
thority,65 for in both cases the generic product was pipe which passed
through middleman contractors and subcontractors and reached the
end-user plaintiffs as a finished, installed product. In both cases the
public body plaintiffs contracted for a finished product installed pur-
suant to contract.
If Mangano and Philadelphia Housing Authority"8 are sustained, the
"windfall" 67 objection to treble damage actions will be moot and the
antitrust violator will retain the fruits of his wrongdoing. Assuming
arguendo that there is a "windfall" in the limited group of cases to
which the term has been applied,68 various factors reduce the practical
significance of the objection. 9 If the successful plaintiff is a public
61. Id.
62. Id. The four cases relied on by plaintiffs are State of Washington v. General
Electric Co., 246 F. Supp. 961 (W.D. Wash. 1965); State of Missouri v. Stupp Bros. Bridge
& Iron Co., 248 F. Supp. 169 (W.D. Mo. 1965); State of Washington v. American Pipe
and Construction Co., 274 F. Supp. 961 (W.D. Wash. 1967), and Armco Steel Corp. v.
State of North Dakota, 376 F.2d 206 (8th Cir. 1967). The court did not identify the three
cases it said make them distinguishable.
63. Supra note 52 at page 89,673.
64. Supra note 62.
65. Supra note 52.
66. Id.
67. Supra notes 2 and 3.
68. Id.
69. Plaintiffs often have "record retention programs" which result in disposal of
purchase records required to prove the purchases portion of an antitrust case, e.g., until
the policy was changed at the request of the Antitrust Division the State of Oregon
destroyed its purchase records after six years. In the Western Pipe Cases certain of the
plaintiffs in the State of Oregon case were unable to identify al1 suppliers of pipe to
middleman contractors who had gone out of business or otherwise could not identify
the manufacturer from which they had purchased the pipe. Accordingly, various trans-
actions were excluded from the settlement where neither side could establish that the
purchases were covered by the settlement.
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ultility, the recovery can be taken into account for rate-adjustment
purposes. The taxpayer receives the benefit if the plaintiff is a public
body. Statutes of limitations, lost or discarded transaction records or
the difficulty of proving the full amount of damages are other obstacles
to obtaining a theoretical quadruple damages. The objection is further
qualified by the observation that:
My experience is that antitrust issues generally are resolved by
attrition rather than by trial in the courthouse, and that they are
decided by calculating minds putting price tags on peace and ex-
pense, rather than by triers of fact attempting to price real dam-
age. 70 .. . [D]efendant counsel usually are aware from the start of
the great value of attrition .... 71
Finally, ". ..[I]f there is to be a windfall, plaintiffs as innocent pur-
chasers should receive it rather than defendants. 72
Running through much of the antitrust literature is the implicit
theory that it is proper for the antitrust victim to be fleeced, but it is
not "sporting" for the victim to seek to recover his losses from the
"white collar" criminal. This theory is apparent in comments con-
cerning successful efforts by victims to make use of the investigations of
antitrust violations by the U.S. Department of Justice and the efforts of
public officials to advise public bodies that they have a cause of action.
As an example, a reference to the electrical equipment conspiracy
contains the observation that "This was not the first time customers of
an industry had moved in to share the spoils of a raid by the Justice
Department."" The description of a "raid" is apt, for the definition of
of the word includes "any sudden invasion of some place by police, for
discovering and dealing with violations of the law."74
The Justice Department did its duty in prosecuting a long-standing
conspiracy. The electrical equipment industry customers and the pub-
lic were victimized by the overcharges, yet attempts to obtain damages
are described as "spoils" instead of reimbursement or recoveries.
The states have been accused of too-zealous an enforcement of the
law:
70. M. A. HOFFMAN, Proof of Damages in Private Litigation, 36 ANTrrRusr L.J. 151(1967).
71. Id. at 167.
72. Commonwealth Edison Company v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company, 355
F.2d 203 (7th Cir. 1964).
73. Supra note 2 at 363.
74. WEFasrE's NEw TwENmwmrH CENTURY DICTIONARY, Unabridged, Second Edition,
p. 1754.
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Moreover, many of these new types of plaintiff seem to feel an
almost Messianic duty to press their suit. For example, many states
suing on behalf of their municipalities felt they had an obligation
to the people of their states not only to sue but also to try the case
unless the defendants compensated them for full damages.7 5 (Em-
phasis Supplied)
No reason was given why a state should be considered for the view that
a lawsuit must be tried in the absence of a satisfactory settlement. A
state and its Attorney General have been criticized for notifying mem-
bers of the class of the pendency of an antitrust action:
*.. Increasingly, I believe, the courts will be forced to look into
these factors which induce a Messianic complex not on the part of
the client but on the part of counsel.. . For instance, consider the
letter recently sent out by the Attorney General of a western state
to municipalities within this state, reading as follows: . . .7
The letter in question advised the municipalities that the Office of the
Attorney General would file a price-fixing suit pursuant to a statute
authorizing filing of treble damage claims, and that cities desiring to
file that type of product antitrust case could file an independent action
or be represented by the outside counsel representing the state. The
letter was analogous to the police notifying persons whose homes had
been burglarized that stolen goods had been recovered and the home-
owners were invited to visit the police station and attempt to identify
the property. The Attorney General notified members of the class that
he was filing a class action on their behalf, as he was authorized to do by
a specific enabling statute that imposed an affirmative duty to represent
the state and its local public bodies in treble damage actions. An
Attorney General should not be criticized, it is submitted, for doing
what he was directed by statute to do-to uphold and advance the
public interest and to take joint legal action.
The speaker also cited a memorandum of the National Institute of
Municipal Law Officers to its members which said in part that "The
NIMLO Committee on Antitrust Violations recommends that inter-
ested member cities join and file a class action." The memorandum
was an attorney-to-attorney type communication and was as proper
as any other communication between attorneys concerning matters
of mutual interest. No public policy appears to be violated when at-
75. Panel discussion, Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act Generally: Developments
at Large and Portents of Things to Come, 37 Axrmusr L.J. 657, 663-664 (1968).
76. Id. at 664.
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torneys for public bodies by notifying attorneys representing public
bodies of a cause of action and a means of aggregation of resources to
prosecute the case.
Treble damage actions by public bodies frequently are class ac-
tions, 77 hence the following passage bears on the issue of the propriety
of a public attorney communicating with other public attorneys con-
cerning possible litigation:
Those who criticize the class action on the ground that it stirs
up plaintiffs and serves only to provide fees for attorneys over-
look the fact that we are not dealing with the traditional lawsuit
which concerns primarily those litigants before the court. The
public's concern with openness and honesty in public securities
markets gives it an interest no less significant than that of par-
ticular plaintiffs and defendants.
Moreover, Rule 23 has built-in limitations against abuse. As
the Supreme Court pointed out in Cohen v. Beneficial Indus-
trial Loan Corp., the strike suit constituted the principal misuse
of this device. Rule 23 remedies this abuse by barring the ex-
tortionate secret settlement.78
The Judicial Plan on Multidistrict Litigation appears to have re-
jected the view that an Attorney General or other public officer or
agency may not, in the course of official duty, communicate with public
bodies concerning class actions. The exemption is contained in a
recommendation by the panel that the district courts adopt a local
court rule to prevent potential abuse of class actions.7 9 The manual's
Suggested Local Rule No. 7 provides in part:
The communications forbidden by this rule, include, but are
not limited to, (a) solicitation directly or indirectly of legal repre-
sentation of potential and actual class members who are not formal
parties to the class action; (b) solicitation of fees and expenses and
agreements to pay fees and expenses, from potential and actual
class members who are not formal parties to the class action;
(c) solicitation by formal parties to the class action of requests by
class members to opt out in class actions under subparagraphs
(b)(c) of Rule 23, F.R.Civ.P.; and (d) communications from coun-
sel or a party which may tend to misrepresent the status, purposes
and effects of the action, and of actual or potential Court orders
therein, which may create impressions tending, without cause, to
77. E.g., State of Illinois v. Brunswick Corporation, 32 F.R.D. 453 (N.D. I11 1963).
But see, State of Utah v. American Pipe and Construction Company, 49 F.R.D. 17 (C.D.
Cal. 1969.
78. Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 487-488 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
79. Supra note 16 at 229.
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reflect adversely on any party, any counsel, the Court, or the
administration of justice.80
Suggested Local Rule No. 7 specifically exempts attorney-client com-
munications and public officer and public agency communications:
This rule does not forbid (1) communications between an at-
torney and his client or a prospective client, who has on the ini-
tiative of the client or prospective client consulted with, employed
or proposed to employ the attorney, or (2) communications occur-
ring in the regular course of business or in the performance of the
duties of a public office or agency (such as the Attorney General)
which do not have the effect of soliciting representation by counsel,
or misrepresenting the status, purposes or effect of the action and
orders therein.81
Where the suggested local rule adopted, an Attorney General or
other public officer would remain free to communicate with public
bodies concerning actual or proposed antitrust litigation. Where a
statute specifically authorizes an Attorney General to represent public
bodies or requires him to give notice of the filing of an action, it would
appear that any such communication would not be the solicitation of
"representation by counsel" within the prohibition of Suggested Local
Rule No. 7. The suggested rule refers to "parties,"8 2 hence by defini-
tion the rule would not apply until filing of the potential or actual
class action. The potential class action members would be free to
communicate concerning the subjects regulated by the suggested rule
until filing of a potential or actual class action.
Suggested Local Rule No. 7 applies to both sides after filing of the
complaint, although the restrictions bear more heavily on plaintiffs.
The suggested rule would hinder plaintiffs, who generally have limited
resources, in seeking and obtaining pre-trial litigation funds from
potential supporters. The defendant counsel is not similarly handi-
capped, for it is the rare antitrust defendant who must solicit defense
funds and agreements to share the burden of a judgment or settle-
ment.8
The suggested rule would have the perhaps unintended effect of
restricting plaintiffs' pre-trial preparation. Members of the class are
prime sources of evidence and in the absence of the suggested rule,
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. There was a sharing agreement in the Western Pipe Cases.
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plaintiffs and their counsel can obtain signed statements and docu-
ments from class members without the knowledge of the defendants.
The suggested rule does not specifically state that the parties cannot
communicate with potential class members to obtain evidence, but
the provision of "included but are not limited to,"8 4 may be construed
to preclude evidence-gathering among class members by plaintiffs with-
out a motion for permission to do so that would alert defendants.
Members of the class so identified thus could be exposed to pressure
and perhaps retaliation before a plaintiff could obtain a statement
or document.
The suggested rule would hinder defendants by, for example, for-
bidding a defendant, without court approval, from soliciting poten-
tial members of the class to sign statements that the member does not
wish to be a member of the class. A recent Opinion of the Oregon
State Bar declares that such solicitation by defendant's counsel or
under his direction is a violation of Rule 11 of the Oregon State Bar
Rules of Professional Conduct, which provides that a member of the
State Bar shall not communicate with a party represented by counsel
upon a subject of controversy in the absence and without the consent
of such counsel.8 5
The opinion responded to the following fact situation:
A, a franchisee of B, files a complaint against B on behalf of him-
self and all other franchisees of B. C., attorney for B, supervises
agents of B who solicit the franchisees to sign a statement that the
signer does not wish to be included in the group which A seeks
to represent, or to be represented by A and his attorneys, but
expresses no opinion as to the merits of the complaint. B and its
franchisees are adversaries if the Court rules that the complaint
may be maintained as a class action. The statements are obtained
directly from the franchisees, although some are represented by
counsel, while the Court has before it A's motion to designate the
complaint a class action. (Emphasis Supplied.)
The opinion cited Rule DR 7-104 of the American Bar Association
Code of Professional Responsibility,8 6 and held:
84. Supra note 79.
85. Opinion No. 192, Communication With Prospective Party to Class Action, Opinions
of Committee on Legal Ethics, amended and approved by the Board of Governors, No-
vember 6, 1970, 31 OREGON STATE BAR BuLLTIN, December 1970.
86. (a) During the course of his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not:
(1) Communicate or cause another to communicate on the subject of the repre-
sentation with a party he knows to be represented by a lawyer in that matter unless
he has the prior consent of the lawyer.
480
Vol. 9: 466, 1971
Commentary
The inquiry is answered in the affirmative with respect to those
franchisees represented by counsel. Those not represented by
counsel may be contracted, provided that a full disclosure con-
cerning the attorney's interest in the matter is made, no repre-
sentations are put forward concerning the legal rights of those
contracted, and scrupulous care is taken that no statement is made
which may tend to mislead the informed.
It is the opinion of the committee, under the facts stated, that
C has violated the provisions of Rule 11 of the Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct of the Oregon State Bar. His purpose in soliciting
statements is other than mere fact-finding, and the individuals
contacted are entitled to know the ramifications of their election.
In order to be properly advised concerning such an election, they
should have the advantage of independent legal advice. The at-
torney has a duty, particularly towards those not represented by
counsel, to avoid everything that may tend to mislead such a
party, and solicitation of such a statement has the tendency to
mislead.87
Prior to publication of Opinion No. 192,88 District Judge A. T.
Goodwin issued an order in a franchisee antitrust case governing un-
authorized communications with potential litigants.8 9 The order was
based on Suggested Local Rule No. 7 and by coincidence incorporated
the essence of Opinion No. 192.90 Included in the order are provisions
allowing the franchisees to communicate among themselves and allow-
ing the plaintiffs' counsel to communicate with franchisees for trial
preparation purposes.91
(2) Give advice to a person who is not represented by a lawyer, other than the
advice to secure counsel, if the interests of such persons are or have a reasonable
possibility of being in conflict with the interests of his client. (Emphasis supplied)
87. Supra note 85.
88. Id.
89. Charles A Vanlandingham, et al. v. Denny's Restaurants, Inc., et al., D. Ore.,
Civil No. 69-424, October 29, 1970.
90. 3. The communications forbidden by this Order include:
(3) solicitation by parties to the action to Denny's Restaurants, Inc. franchisees to
take a position concerning the action.
(4) solicitation or negotiation by defendants, their counsel or their officers, agents
or employees to Denny's Restaurants, Inc. franchisees with intent to prevail upon
any such franchisees not to become a plaintiff in intervention or to withdraw from
the action;
(5) offers by defendants herein, their counsel or their officers, agents or employees
to any Denny's Restaurants, Inc. franchisees to purchase their franchise, amend their
franchise agreement with any defendant or subsidiary of any defendant, compromise
any claim against the franchisee, or in any other way, method or manner, to influence
or attempt to influence any such franchisee not to become a plaintiff in intervention
herein; . ...
91. (4) This order does not forbid: ...
(c) communications between the plaintiffs herein and present and former Denny's
Restaurants, Inc. franchisees which do not have the effect of soliciting representation
by counsel or solicitation of litigation funds or agreements to pay fees and expenses
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Despite the announcement of the opening of the Golden Age of the
antitrust plaintiff,92 and the claim that a recent decision "was the ill
wind that could blow the lid off a Pandora's box of unwarranted liti-
gation,"9 3 the obstacles to the most meritorious claim remain formi-
dable. During the first 50 years of the Sherman Act, plaintiffs were suc-
cessful in only 13 of 175 treble damage actions, recovering $1,270,000,
while decisions awarding an additional $12,756,000 were overruled by
appellate courts.9 4 "Of 169 cases tried between 1952 and 1958, 28 were
won and 141 were lost." 95 "The odds favor the defendant."90 Even if
the plaintiff prevails, the court may reject or exclude evidence of dam-
ages and award nominal damages representing but a fraction of the
cost to the plaintiff of prosecuting his case to a "successful" conclu-
sion.9 7 And indeed, Joseph L. Alioto, a dean of the plaintiff's antitrust
bar, has listed three of the obstacles to the "Golden Age"-a war of
attrition, a sometimes hostile judge, and an inability to procure evi-
dence after proper discovery orders have been signed and executed.
9 8
Assuming a prospective antitrust plaintiff has a meritorious claim,
the first obstacle is financial. With exceptions the antitrust victim is a
small or bankrupted businessman of limited means who may lack the
resources to prosecute his claim, even on a contingent basis, because
of the heavy pre-trial expense for which antitrust litigation is un-
happily noted. This writer has observed that defendants display an
inordinate interest in determining the financial resources of a private
in this action, or misrepresenting the status, purposes or effect of the action, orders
and their counsel herein;
(d) communications between the plaintiffs herein, and present and former Denney's
Restaurants, Inc. franchisees solely for purposes of trial preparation herein which do
not have the effect of soliciting representation by counsel or solicitation of litigation
funds or agreements to pay fees and expenses in this action, or misrepresenting the
status, purposes, or effect of the action and orders herein.
92. Supra note 2 at 363.
93. Supra note 1 at 154.
94. Proof Requirements in Anti-Trust Suits: The Obstacles to Treble Damage Recovery,
18 U. CHicAGo L.R. 130, 138 (1958).
95. Supra note 11 at 92.
96. M. L. BLECHER, The Plaintiffs Viewpoint, 38 ANTrrrusr L.J. 50, 51 (1968).
97. In Courtesy Chevrolet, Inc. v. Tennessee Walking Horse Breeders' and Exhibitors'
Association of America, 393 F.2d 75 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. den. 393 U.S. 938, plaintiff spent
$78,496.40 in attorneys' fees and expenses. He was awarded nominal damages trebled to
$10,200, costs taxed at $4,603.92 and $5,000 attorneys' fees. The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals doubled the attorneys' fees to $10,000 for 2,289 hours of litigation effort.
98. Supra note 11 at 92. "The years that followed the enactment of the treble damage
provisions revealed that few private litigants had the resources or staying power to conduct
a protracted and difficult antitrust case. And those who were able and willing to assume
the staggering costs of litigants were frequently worn out by their opponents by sheer
attrition." United States v. Standard Ultramarine and Color Company, 137 F. Supp.
167. 171, foonote 4 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
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plaintiff," presumably to evaluate whether he has the means to finance
his case in the face of attrition. The disparity in resources is evident
in cases in which the plaintiff is represented by one or two attorneys
and the defendants, whose resources may total in the billions, are rep-
resented by the proverbial courtroom of attorneys on a minor motion.
A common obstacle may be termed the de minimus problem. The
claim may be meritorious, but the estimated recovery, even after
trebling, does not appear to justify the effort and expense because of
the relatively small amount of purchases involved.100 This obstacle
becomes more controlling if the case is transferred to a distant dis-
trict, thereby increasing the travel and associate counsel costs. Public
bodies, especially the smaller ones, frequently encounter the de mini-
mus problem and may not take action unless other co-plaintiffs agree
to join and share expenses and carry their share of the burden of
prosecuting the case.
Another obstacle is the chilling effect on a prospective plaintiff of
the customary disparity in size and resources. "A man operating a gas
station is bound to be overawed by the great corporation that is his
supplier, his banker, and his landlord."'' Consequently, members of
a class may understandably be reluctant to become parties to litigation
in which their resources are limited and, in their eyes, the defendant's
resources are unlimited.
The financially capable plaintiff then must surmount numerous legal
defenses which can and often do deprive plaintiffs of reimbursement
for damages for reasons that have nothing to do with the justice of
the case. As stated by John R. Hally:
I think anyone who has worked with treble damage litigation
for any length of time has seen cases with excellent liability thrown
99. "I was called upon some years ago to defend a couple of treble damage cases, but
they did not get any farther than an order that I obtained from the federal judge re-
quiring the plaintiff to furnish copies of his income tax returns." DAUGLAS ARANT, Section
2 of the Sherman Act, 37 ANTITRUST L.J. 643, 644 (1968).
100. In denying a class action motion, State of Utah v. American Pipe and Construction
Company, 49 F.R.D. 17 (C.D. Cal. 1969), quoted in footnote 19 the affidavit of an Assistant
Attorney General for the State of Idaho which said in part that "... the Special Assistant
Attorney General informed ROBERT M. ROBSON that the State of Idaho did not sustain
sufficient damage as a result of the alleged violations in the above entitled matter to
warrant the expense involved in instituting an independent action on behalf of the State
of Idaho. Relying upon this advice, the Idaho Attorney General did not file a complaint
against the above named Defendants." The reasons cited in the affidavit support the
statement in Epstein v. Weiss, 50 F.R.D. 387, 395 (La. 1970) that "The class action is
obviously superior in cases such as this where a large number of individuals may have
been injured, but where no one person may have been damaged to the degree which
would have induced him to institute litigation solely on his own behalf .. "
101. Shell Oil v. Federal Trade Commission, 360 F.2d 470, 487 (5th Cir. 1966).
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out of court or fail in terms of damages or meaningful recovery
for such reasons as that in the contemplation of the law the plain-
tiff simply is not a damaged party, as the courts view it, he is not
in the target area of the defendant's violation no matter how clear
they may be.10 2
The obstacle can start at the complaint-drafting stage. In some juris-
dictions antitrust complaints appear to be an exception to the provi-
sions of the federal rules that a short and plain statement of the
jurisdiction and claim is sufficient, 03 although a leading commentator
asserts with authority that "the dispute appears to have been resolved
in favor of notice pleading.' 04
If the plaintiff believes the complaint may be attacked on grounds
such as lack of interstate commerce, detailed allegations of the flow of
commerce across state lines are desirable. Standing to sue requires
violation of the antitrust laws as defined' 05-interstate trade or com-
merce, injury to business or property, and causal relationship or con-
nection between the violation and the injury.106 The reports are filled
with cases in which a plaintiff's claim was dismissed without adjudi-
cation of the merits. 0 7 One or more defendants may move to dismiss or
transfer the case for lack of venue. The motion, if granted, forces the
plaintiff to sue in a distant judicial district rather than in the district
of his choice and can place him at a tactical and financial disadvantage.
However, the antitrust venue statutes 05 allow a corporate defendant
102. Primer on New Directions and Old Guideposts in Antitrust: Principles, Policies
and People, Third New England Antitrust Conference 144 (1969).
103. Rule 8, F.R. Civ. P. "The new rules, however, restrict the pleadings to the task
of general notice-giving." Hickman v. Taylor, 29 U.S. 495, 501 (1947).
104. E. C. TIMBERLAKE, Federal Treble Damage Antitrust Actions 61-62 (1965). How-
ever, in Burkhead v. Phillips Petroleum Company, 308 F. Supp. 120, 122 (N.D. Calif. 1970)
the court said of exclusive supplier and per se retail price maintenance allegations:
The vice of these allegations is the failure of plaintiff to set out supporting facts
showing how Phillips has controlled the retail prices charged by plaintiff for gasoline
and in what manner Phillips has exercised this control so as to violate the antitrust
laws. Without such additional facts, the recitation concerning Phillips' control over
retail gasoline prices is merely a conclusion of law and an improper pleading.
Similarly, Bailey's Bakery, Ltd. v. Continental Baking Company, 235 F. Supp. 705, 713
(Haw. 1964) said the complaint "must allege facts showing that the defendants' acts
unduly and appreciably restrained or may reasonably be expected to restrain the free
flow of interstate commerce."
105. Supra note 1.
106. W. A. BATEs, The Treble Damage Remedy: Standing to Sue, Venue and Process,
38 CINCINNATI L.R. 168, 269 (1969); State of Minnesota v. United States Steel Corporation,
299 F. Supp. 506, 600-601 (Minn. 1969). Also see, John Kalin Funeral Home, Inc. v. Fultz,
313 F. Supp. 435 (W.D. Wash. 1970) and Sun Valley Disposal Co. v. Silver State Disposal
Co., 420 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1969).
107. Eg., First National Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253 (1968), and
Nationwide Auto Appraiser Service v. Association of Casualty and Surety Companies, 382
F.2d 925 (10th Cir. 1967).
108. Supra note 106 at 273; 15 U.S.C. 15, 22.
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to be sued in any district in which it is an inhabitant, may be found,
or transacts business, and affords only limited protection to defen-
dants.109 The general venue statute110 supplements the antitrust venue
statutes,"' and has been amended to authorize venue in the judicial
district "in which the claim arose."
Another defense is the statute of limitations," 2 which commences
to run when the interest of the plaintiff is injured or invaded, but is
subject to tolling for fraudulent concealment and certain government
actions. 113 In cases where the last injury occurred after the running
of the statute of limitations a plaintiff's claim may be barred if an
officer or employee was aware of the conspiracy prior to the date of
the last occurrence. Still to be determined on a case-by-case basis are the
precise boundaries of the pari delicto exemption in Perma Life which is
granted to plaintiffs who do not bear an equal responsibility for cre-
ating and establishing an illegal scheme or who are required by
economic pressures to accept such an agreement. 14 There are a host
of exemptions, statutory and judicially created, that may bar a cause
of action. 5 However, "Immunity from the antitrust laws is not lightly
implied"""' and ".. . Regulated industries are not per se exempt from
the Sherman Act."' 17
Proof of damages is the final and sometimes insurmountable obstacle.
To recover damages in a private action, the plaintiff must prove that
the defendant violated the antitrust laws, that the violation caused
damage to the plaintiff, and the amount of the damage so caused."18
"I think we have also seen cases where both violation and fact of dam-
age were well established and the plaintiff failed through lack of
adequate proof of amount of damages."" 9
109. Thill Securities Corporation v. New York Stock Exchange, 283 F. Supp. 239, 245
(Wis. 1968).
110. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).
111. ABC Great States, Inc. v. Globe Ticket Company, 304 F. Supp. 1052, 1054-1055
(N.D. Ill. 1969); Albert Levine Associates v. Bertoni & Cotti, 314 F. Supp. 169, 171
(S.D.N.Y. 1970).
112. 15 U.S.C. § 15b.
113. Supra note 106 at 284-285.
114. Premier Electric Construction Company v. Miller-Davis Company, 442 F.2d 1132,
1138 (7th Cir. 1970).
115. Zn'sER, The Anatomy of Judicial Exemptions from Antitrust: A Study in Gap-
Filling, 15 WAYNE L.R. 813 (1969).
116. California v. Federal Power Commission, 369 U.S. 482, 485 (1962).
117. Georgia v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 324 U.S. 439, 456 (1945). But neither the
Sherman Act nor the Clayton Act was intended to authorize restraint of governmental
action. Alabama Power Company v. Alabama Electric Cooperative, 394 F.2d 672 (5th Cir.
1968), cert den. 393 U.S. 488.
118. Supra note 106 at 316.
119. Supra note 102 at 144.
485
Duquesne Law Review
A number of the obstacles are judicially created and have had the
effect of narrowing the field of action, although it may be assumed that
a defendant would declare that a restrictive or interpretative decision
merely precluded unwarranted litigation. A study made for this article
supports the view that the lower federal courts often take an unduly
restrictive view of the antitrust laws to the disadvantage of plaintiffs,
governmental and private. The study covered 20 years of Supreme
Court decisions ended December 31, 1969, and counted as "reversed"
any decision pertaining to the Sherman, Clayton or Robinson-Patman
acts that were reversed in whole or in part or vacated and remanded,
except one decision "modified and affirmed." Of the 120 antitrust cases
during the 20-year period, the Supreme Court reversed 96, or 80 per
cent. Plaintiffs prevailed on appeal in 101, or 84 per cent, of the cases.
While it may be assumed that a number of cases were decided to
reverse erroneous lower court decisions, it is significant that the plain-
tiffs, not defendants, prevailed in the overwhelming majority of the
decisions. Thirty-seven of the 120 cases were private actions. Of the 37
private actions, the plaintiffs prevailed in 30, or 81 per cent. The Su-
preme Court reversed 33, or 89 per cent, of the 37 private actions.
Starting with the electrical equipment cases, a growing number
of states and their local public bodies have entered the treble dam-
age field. The number and variety of cases since 1960 suggests that
illegal price-fixing is much more prevalent in the case of sales to gov-
ernment agencies than in the case of sales to private firms.120 Analysis
of Sherman Act indictments for the period 1955 to 1965 listed indict-
ments in 38 of the 78 major groups in the standard industrial classi-
fication, including indictments in 18 of the 21 groups in the manu-
facturing division. 21
The states and their public agencies have responded to the problem
by prosecuting cases alone or in cooperation with other states and pub-
lic bodies. It is becoming a common practice for separate cases in
various judicial districts to be transferred to one district for consoli-
dated proceedings, 122 enabling the plaintiffs to share expenses common
to all cases and to spread the workload while obtaining the benefit of
the expertise of the more experienced plaintiffs.
120. KUHLMAN, Nature and Significance of Price Fixing Rings, 2 ANTITRUsT & Eco-
NOMICS REvixw No. 3, 69, 77 (1969).
121. L. EARLE BiRzD1-1, JR., What Can Be Done to Minimize Danger of Antitrust Litiga-
tion? Preventive Measures, Handling Government Investigations and the Roles of Corporate
Counsel and Outside Counsel, 38 ANTIrrRusr L.J. 126 (1968).
122. Supra note 16.
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Although some defense attorneys may believe that the states are
entirely too active in prosecuting treble damage actions, a number of
meritorious cases have not been filed for lack of funds, manpower and
related reasons. This observation can be tested by comparing the
number of states that filed suit in various national conspiracy actions
with the number that theoretically could have filed suit.
Two legislative actions would enable the states and their local public
bodies to make better use of state and federal antitrust laws to prose-
cute their antitrust claims:
1. A declaration of legislative intent to enable the Attorney General
to prosecute antitrust claims and to assist local public bodies in anti-
trust matters. This declaration of legislative intent can be embodied in
statutes of the type enacted by Oregon, 2 3 Kansas 124 and Ohio. 25
2. Appropriations sufficient to enable the Attorney General to im-
plement the legislative declaration of intent. Oregon and New Jersey
and perhaps other states have created a statutory antitrust revolving
account to finance litigation. 26
Meanwhile, the antitrust enforcement states such as California can
123. ORS 30.312 provides:
The State of Oregon, any city, county, school district, municipal or public corpora-
tion, political subdivision of the State of Oregon or any instrumentality thereof,
or any agency created by two or more political subdivisions to provide themselves
governmental services may bring an action in behalf of itself and others similarly
situated for damages under ORS 279.032 or under section 4 of the Act of October 15,
1914, ch. 323, as amended prior to January 1, 1965 (15 U.S.C. 15).
124. 6 Kansas Statutes Annotated § 75-713 provides:
Whenever it appears that the state of Kansas or any city, town, political subdivision
or other governmental agency, body or authority established under the laws of the
state of Kansas has been so injured or damaged by any conspiracy, combination or
agreement in restraint of trade or commerce or similar unlawful actions, so as to
entitle the state of Kansas, a city, a town or political subdivision or other such
governmental agency, body or authority to a right to bring any action or proceeding
for the recovery of damages under the provisions of any state or federal anti-trust or
other similar law, the attorney general shall have the authority to institute and
prosecute any such actions or proceedings on behalf of the state of Kansas or of any
city, town, or political subdivision, or other governmental agency, body or authority
established under the laws of the state of Kansas or any city, town, political sub-
division or other governmental agency, body or authority in such actions or pro-
ceedings.
125. 1 Page's Ohio Revised Code Annotated, Title 1, Chapter 109, provides:
Sec. 109.81. The attorney general shall act as the attorney at law for the state and
may act, by agreement, as the attorney at law for any political subdivision of the
state or governing body thereof in antitrust cases and do all things necessary to
properly represent them in any such case under the laws of any state or the federal
government.
126. ORS 180.095; New Jersey Laws of 1970, Chapter 73, approved and effective May
21, 1970, appropriated $100,000 for an antitrust revolving account. CCH TRADE REGULATION
REPORTER 33,301.19. Also see, CCH TRADE REGULATION REPORTER 31,931, relating
to a Kansas Attorney General's antitrust revolving fund, and Section 109.82, 1 Page's Ohio
Revised Code Annotated, Title 1, Chapter 109, creating a section of antitrust and the
Attorney General antitrust fund.
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continue to increase their exchange of information and consultation
activity to include states not now active in antitrust enforcement. Inter-
state cooperation in this field has proved beneficial to the cooperating
states and expansion of this pro bono activity should prove equally
beneficial to other states, their taxpayers, and equally important, the
competitive enterprise system.
488
Vol. 9: 466, 1971
DUQUESNE
LAW REVIEW
Published by Students of the Duquesne University School of Law,
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
SINGLE COPY $2.50
BOARD OF EDITORS
WILLIAM C. COSTOPOULOS
Editor-in-Chief
STEPHEN M. SOKOL
Article Editor
WILLIAM J. McKim
Recent Decisions Editor
GARY R. CASSAVECHIA
Comment Editor
STANLEY M. STEIN
Book Review Editor
JOSEPH C. VISALLI
Managing Editor
ASSOCIATE EDITORS
FREDERICK B. GiEG DENNIS E. McARLE
PAUL F. BARCHIE
ROBERT T. BARLETTA
WILLIAM C. BARTLEY
ELMER S. BEATrY
BART M. BEIER
DIANNE M. FABER
CHARLES J. FONZONE
JOSEPH B. GREEN
JERRY A. JOHNSON
DANIEL JOSEPH
JOSEPH P. KELLY
STAFF
CHARLES W. KENRICK
JOHN STEPHEN KREGLOW
MARCIA I. LAPPAS
JOHN K. LEWIS
ROBERT W. MCCLURE
BERNADINE MEYER
JAMES R. MILLER
RONALD C. MOKOWSKI
WALTER J. ORZE
HENRY S. PERKIN
JOHN M. RIDLON
JAMES L. Ross
THOMAS M. SCHULTZ
M. LAWRENCE SHIELDS III
THOMAS N. SILVERMAN
RONALD M. STEIN
RICHARD 1. THOMAS
DENNIS L. VERALDI
JOSEPH E. VOGRIN III
STEPHEN G. WALKER
Ross WEIss
LEONARD J. ZAPLER
CORNELUS F. MURPHY, JR.
Faculty Advisor
